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On the Evolution of Subjective Experience 
Jerome A. Feldman (ICSI and UC Berkeley) 
 
1. Prologue 
“The most beautiful thing we can experience is the mysterious. It is the source of all art 
and science.”  Einstein 
 
The ancient mind-body problem continues to be one of deepest mysteries of science 
and of the human spirit. To experience some of the mystery of vision, look up from this 
text and consider the richness of your surrounds. All of this magnificence is produced 
for your personal experience in ways that remain unknown. For one thing, your eyes 
shift about two hundred times per minute without your mind noticing it. The resulting 
mental “illusion” is a large detailed stable image of the scene. The stable image in the 
mind enables us to act effectively as if our vision system were like a camera. But 
despite millennia of effort, no one understands the link between the visual system 
(body) and the mind.  
 
One underlying issue is that terms like “mind” and “consciousness” have many 
meanings that confound scientific study. The core of the mind-body mystery (often 
called the hard problem) has always rested on our phenomenal feelings of Subjective 
Experience (SE) and this term will be used here. An alternative framing is to talk about 
the naturalization of the mind. We now know more than ever about the structure and 
function of the body and brain, but there is no comparable science of SE in an 
embodied mind. 
 
The overall aim of this article is to shed light on the enduring mystery of human SE. If 
SE has a conventional embodied substrate, there should be a related evolutionary 
history. Even though the mind-body problem currently remains a mystery, we can try to 
localize where reductionist explanations break down. This involves applying 
computational analysis to the problem of mapping mental phenomena to embodied 
neural structure. 
 
The philosopher David Chalmers, who has thought as much as anyone about the hard 
problem (1) says: 
“I do not claim that idealism is plausible. No position on the mind–body problem is 
plausible. Materialism is implausible. Dualism is implausible. Idealism is implausible. 
Neutral monism is implausible. None-of-the-above is implausible. “ 
 
The formulation of the hard problem remains a central issue in contemporary 
philosophy. A recent book by Weisberg (2) presents a good overview of the main 
approaches. A core issue for both science and philosophy concerns what SE (or 
Consciousness) contributes to evolutionary fitness, and this is the focus of the current 
paper. The latest book on the mind by the philosopher Dan Dennett 
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scientific basis of mental evolution, but focuses on language-based uniquely human 
capabilities and does not directly address SE. 
 
There is an important difference between the philosophical and scientific framing of the 
hard problem of the mind. Historically, philosophers made important empirical as well as 
conceptual contributions. However, with the rise of positivism around 1900, 
philosophers focused on analyzing words and arguments, and avoided empirical topics. 
Much of current academic philosophy explicitly precludes science. 
  
“For many, philosophy is essentially the a priori analysis of concepts, which can and should be 
done without leaving the proverbial armchair. 
“https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts/#AttConAna  Section 5. 
 
This stance authorizes the detailed examination of concepts such as panpsychism (everything 
has some mind) and materialism (mind is an illusion). It also includes extensive treatment of 
philosophical “zombies” - creatures that have all of the features and capabilities of humans 
except subjective experience. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds (4) 
explores many other aspects of animal minds from a philosophical perspective. The 
philosophical approach almost exclusively addresses Consciousness, which is much broader 
than SE and, in fact, is not well defined. A current overview of this work can be found in the 54 
chapters of the Blackwell Companion to Consciousness (5). The introduction allows that: 
“Consciousness studies are frequently criticized for failing to define precisely what 
Consciousness is. In this respect there has been little change over the last two 
centuries” 
 
The alternative expression, Subjective Experience (SE), is much better defined and is 
generally agreed to be an essential feature of Consciousness. The defining problem of 
SE is the embodied foundation of your private 1st person feelings. No other initial 
assumptions are appropriate. Focused SE research can provide important insights on 
the general problem of Consciousness. It can be studied in (some) non-human animals 
and avoids many other deep and important aspects of mind. There is good evidence for 
SE in creatures where there is no indication of many other mental traits such as the 
sense of self, agency, Narrative Consciousness, language, Higher Order Thought, etc.   
We can lump all these traits as meta-cognition (C2 in ref 6) and as being beyond the 
scope of this article. SE is ubiquitous; everything that we are or can be aware of is an 
SE, pretty much by definition. Some causes of SE, such as empathy, subliminal input, 
or dreams, are not usually considered conscious, but do evoke subjective emotion and 
perception (7). 
 
Scientific approaches to SE, like this one, focus on the standard questions of structure, 
behavior, and experiment. The goal of science is to explain phenomena. One fairly new 
development is the realization that the world is not deterministic and that probabilistic 
formulations are required. There has been remarkable progress in understanding the 
neural and bodily foundation of much of human behavior and its application to social 
problems. Sapolsky’s recent book “Behave” (40) is an excellent and approachable 
overview of these advances. A major exception remains where the defining 
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phenomenon is 1st person experience. Unless you believe that you have subjective 
experience, you can not address the mind-brain problem. The basic problem remains 
the same even if you try to explain only your own SE. 
 
There is an extensive literature on subjective experience, but almost all of it focuses on 
two domains – perception and emotions. In fact, SE is important in a wide range of 
phenomena including speech, dreams, empathy, phantom limbs, tool embodiment, etc. 
Other SE include time travel, replay, imagination and simulation. The last two terms are 
often used as synonyms (85). I prefer simulation because it suggests mechanisms. The 
general term simulation (8) is adequate and is widely used in embodied approaches to 
cognitive science (44). There is strong evidence for mental simulation in mammals (9) 
and for at least dreaming in birds (10). The theme of simulation will be revisited in the 
Vertebrates section and it will be suggested as plausible substrate for SE. 
 
My working hypothesis is that there is an (unknown) general function that maps from 
bodily, including neural, activity to SE. I have evaluated the consistency of proposed 
theories of SE and the mind with findings in anatomy, experiment, computation, and 
experience and failed to find any currently proposed theory that is adequate (11). This 
paper explores whether an evolutionary approach can shed some light on the mystery. 
 
Evolution, especially of humans, is another scientific question of profound importance, 
but it is not considered to be mysterious.  Rapid advances in theory and in a wide range 
of experimental techniques have led to greatly improved understanding of many of the 
key evolutionary events and developments (12). There are still unresolved issues and 
controversies, but many deep questions have been clarified over the last few decades.  
Perhaps the most famous scientific quote about evolution is Dobzhansky (42): 
 
“Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution.” 
 
This is justifiably profound, but is often over-interpreted to imply that biology is totally 
determined by genetic evolution. Evolution, like gravity, is fundamental property of our 
world. However, living beings thrive by overcoming and exploiting gravity, evolutionary 
processes, and other aspects of Nature. One obvious case is niche construction, where 
animals restructure their environment. The expanded view of evolution as involving 
epigenetic effects, including culture, is called the Eco-Evo-Devo approach (43). This is 
the sense of evolution that we adopt here. 
 
By contrast, the mysteries of the mind are becoming increasingly profound as the 
sciences of brain and behavior advance. Until fairly recently, many scientists, including 
me, assumed that we would eventually find brain circuits and functions that explain 
subjective experience. However, as a result of massive cooperative efforts (13), all large 
areas of the brain already have known functions (Figure 1) so the hope for unknown 
mechanisms depends on new science. 
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 Figure 1.  Flat maps of the Human Brain (13)  
 
Figure 1A is a standard flattened projection of one hemisphere of the human brain with the 
various areas colored. The numbers refer to the traditional Brodmann classification of brain 
regions from their anatomical details. Modern methods (37) have further refined this picture 
and elaborated the basic functions computed in these different areas. Figure 1B provides more 
detail on this functional separation in the visual system, which is at the core of the neural 
binding problem, one of the core mysteries. 
. 
Figure 1A shows that the functionality of the cerebral cortex is basically known (37) – there is 
no large available space for current neural computation of currently mysterious phenomena. In 
addition, various aspects of our visual experience are primarily computed in distinct and often 
distant interacting circuits. For example, in Figure 1B color calculation is based in the bright 
green area V4v and motion calculation involves several areas: V3, V3A, MT, etc.  In spite of 
this extreme separation of function, we experience the world as an integrated image with 
objects that combine all visual properties and even associate these with other senses like 
sound when appropriate.   
 
The mystery of how all this happens is called the “hard binding problem” (11). This is one of 
the classic hard problems that continues to motivate current research and theory in SE. No 
one has proposed a plausible explanation of this mystery; we will reconsider the mysteries of 
experience in the Conclusions section. 
 
The goal of this article is to approach SE from an evolutionary perspective – how could SE and 
the mind have evolved? Many distinguished clinicians, experimentalists, theoreticians, and 
philosophers have worked on ambitious projects on the evolution of mind (14-26). None of 
these claim complete success in explaining the mind/body problem and neither will I. However, 
there has been considerable progress on clarifying the issues and providing grounding for 
continued scientific research. 
 
The first and most fundamental evolutionary criterion is fitness. There are many contributing 
factors to evolution, including considerable randomness. Still, a trait of any living creature 
 5 
tends to survive and evolve according to that trait’s contribution to adaptive fitness. For our 
purposes, the evolution of SE and its precursors offers important constraints on the present 
function and realization of embodied experience. A crucial concept here is actionability (8). 
Nature determines the fitness of actions, but an organism can only compute actionability, its 
internal estimate of the expected fitness of possible actions, using its internal model (17). In 
simple cases like the amoeba or human reflexes, actionability reduces to initiating immediate 
action. For complex creatures like us, actionability can entail significant exploration and 
planning and evokes SE.  
 
Actionability is an extension of Gibson’s idea of perceptual affordances, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance that adds quantitative, probabilistic, active, situational, 
goal- directed perception and reasoning. It is also an extension of the popular Bayesian Brain 
movement (27) to incorporate the requisite expected utility (28) of perceptions and actions. 
Evolution selects on immediate, life-long, and social goals as they contribute to reproductive 
success, so actionability should include these as well.  
 
The precursors of SE, such as valence (16, 24), which is an organism’s evaluation of positive 
and negative stimuli and perceptual constancies like size and color (19), contribute to 
actionability estimates and thus directly to fitness. The next Section, Origins, explores some 
basic life needs of all organisms and how primitive solutions to these needs are often mistaken 
for core properties of human SE. Almost all of the myriad evolutionary SE theories start with a 
presumption that the mind will be fully explained by understanding the brain – this is 
sometimes-called “temporary mysterianism”.  This position is justified by assertions that the 
only alternative is to postulate some non-physical effects beyond science. It is true that there is 
no evidence for SE in the absence of related bodily activity and the possibility remains that 
other currently unknown physical processes can explain SE. There is my alternative 
formulation, agnostic mysterianism (30) that explicitly acknowledges current mysteries (of the 
mind, quantum theory, etc.) and also that they may or may not be resolved by current or future 
science. 
 
This allowance for mystery becomes more important because recent results (11) show that 
some subjective aspects of everyday experience are inconsistent with existing and proposed 
theories of neural computation. Some of these mysterious experiences are instance are 
instances of classical mind/body problems like the binding problem (19) and the “illusion” of a 
detailed stable visual world (11). The inconsistency proofs involve straightforward analysis of 
common phenomena against proposed neural substrates.  
 
For example, Figure1 shows that visual features are computed in separated brain areas, but 
we perceive unified objects in full bound detail. Perhaps the most striking example is the SE of 
continuous motion from sequences of still images in films, videos, and normal vision. This 
situation is nicely summarized in the following 3/14/19 personal communication from Ken 
Nakayama: 
 
“Despite the fact that this class of Gestalt psychology type demonstrations have been 
known for over 100 years, the actual physiological basis of any of them is unknown. In 
fact, it is something that I covered in my large and lengthy review (29) of image motion 
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processing in 1985. I wager that there is no known satisfying physiological 
understanding of perceived motion experience most generally. This despite the fact that 
there are hundreds of papers on the physiology and psychophysics of motion.” 
 
In the history of science, such inconsistencies often lead to major conceptual advances. 
A recent article (30) suggests focusing mind/body research on the border between 
known and mysterious phenomena and provides some promising examples. Some of 
these will be discussed in later sections. 
 
The current paper extends the agnostic program of exploring the mind-body problem 
without presupposing a solution (the brain). In particular, my approach assumes that 
there is no known solution that is consistent within current neuroscience and that some 
fundamental breakthrough would be needed. It is also open to the possibility that there 
are indeed mysteries beyond human comprehension. If this upsets you, consider 
whether chimpanzees could understand science (31). 
 
As far as I know, none of the many evolutionary approaches to the mind-body problem 
includes any consideration of the inconsistency with SE of current theories of 
neuroscience (11). To be fair, all of them stipulate that there are remaining mysteries 
and some of the articles do contain important insights.  
 
One important common strategy is to separate the mind-body problem, SE, etc. into two 
distinct sub-problems. The embodied first problem of emotion, perception, etc. is 
assumed to be tractable and approachable within existing science. The second sub-
problem directly involves the mind and the mystery of SE. For example, studies of 
emotion usually reserve “emotion” for the embodied cases and use “feelings” for the 
mental aspects (32). 
 
My agnostic approach treats mysteries as the core problem and focuses on 
computational considerations – how could we have subjective experiences that are 
inconsistent with current computational neuroscience and how could this phenomenon 
have evolved? This entails hypothesizing an explicit, unknown function called X or Chi 
that maps from an embodied realization of a phenomenon to its awareness in the mind. 
The next section, Origins, discusses how some physical aspects of SE occur very early 
in evolution. The mapping X remains a mystery, but evolution suggests some 
precursors and relevant experiments.  
 
Much of the work referenced here does explicitly employ the term consciousness and I 
will follow their usage with the understanding that subjective experience is the issue of 
current concern. Several more or less equivalent terms are employed to describe the 
subjective experience (SE) associated with the mind, but SE appears to be the most 
focused and least ambiguous.   For the core vocabulary, we will consider the following 
as sharing meaning: Phenomenology, Subjectivity, 1st person Experience.  Single 
terms like awareness, experience, and sensation are sometimes employed, but they 
have numerous other uses and will not appear here.  
  
 7 
The term Qualia is also employed, but it has too many versions for our purposes. Since 
all of these terms (like mind) refer by default to the human mind, we will need another 
term to denote mind-like behavior in non-human animals. For many purposes, the term 
agent captures the general idea of a living animal. There is more discussion of the 
importance of language issues in the science of SE in (30). Almost all general 
discussions of SE focus on either emotions or perception and occasionally both. We will 
start with these two phenomena, but will examine several other instances of SE, including 
dreams, extended motor control like a blind man’s cane, and anomalous body 
experiences.    
 
No one seriously argues against the idea that (many) mammals have experiences 
(14,20,25) that share some of the properties of human perception and emotions like pain, 
fear, anger, joy, disgust, etc. It is also clear that there are important differences, at least in 
that only people can talk about such experiences. If we assume that subjective 
experience has evolved then there must be evolutionary precursors that also need to be 
studied (16, 20, 26). Evolutionary considerations are the core concern of this paper. 
 
One useful distinction is the recent C0, C1, and C2 definitions in Dehaene et al. (6). They 
define C0 as unconscious neural activity that is not experienced, C1 as activity that is 
accessible for computation and report, and C2 as self-monitoring of C1. The discussion in (6) 
focuses on some simple information processing functions of C1 and C2, but the classification 
is much more general.  One benefit of this suggestion is that the symbols C0,1,2 do not come 
with any conceptual baggage. Another advantage of this proposal is that it provides a label 
(C0) for the vast range of behavior in the absence of awareness. The functions of C0, C1, and 
C2 are not mutually exclusive and often overlap, for example, when you stumble while walking. 
 
Human C0 (6) behavior ranges from reflexes and other intrinsic circuits to homeostasis and 
language understanding. In fact, much human activity (e.g. driving) requires automatization to 
C0 and cannot be done mindfully as C1.  In this terminology, SE corresponds roughly to C1 
and each involves both the embodied emotions and the mental feelings (32).  A complication is 
that automatized behavior (C0) can give rise to SE. For example, unconscious interoception 
systems evoke SE of hunger, fatigue, etc. Emotions are normally automatic, but definitely 
evoke SE (32, p. 83)) 
 
There is general agreement that subjective experience (SE) is an essential aspect of the mind 
and of any notion of consciousness - we will focus on SE unless specifically stated otherwise. 
There is considerable evidence that some animals have C1 but not C2.  C2 does seem 
necessary for language - for example to express “I used to like candy”. The many important 
functions of C2 are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
However, a huge problem is that SE is essential but still mysterious. Researchers in fields 
such as emotion and perception continue to make progress, often by deferring any questions 
involving subjective experience. A significant fraction of the research on emotions and on 
perception explicitly excludes SE, acknowledging the present mysteries. A striking recent 
example is the magisterial book by Adolphs and Anderson entitled “The Neuroscience of 
Emotion” (32). The authors choose this title because they explicitly omit any considerations of 
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SE. As part of their justification for this, they invoke the great success of this separation 
strategy in perception research. The Nakayama quote above on motion perception makes the 
same point about the remaining mystery of the bodily realization of perception. 
 
More generally, it is essential to distinguish the two distinct general aspects of SE. Any SE in 
perception, emotion, motor control, etc. has an embodied substrate that may or may not be 
understood. Even when the embodied basis of perception and emotion is understood, many of 
the ancient mysteries have no known embodied realization (11).  As proposed above, this 
entails a (mysterious) function X or Chi (30) that maps from bodily activity to subjective 
experience and is the core of the Mind-Body problem. 
 
 Our discussion in the next section will include protozoa with no neurons, so “neuroscience” is 
not always the appropriate term. The general form of the mystery is simply: “X maps from 
bodily activity to related SE”. To avoid unnecessary pedantry, we stipulate that neural firing is 
the dominant component of X bodily activity in vertebrates. All of our discussions of particular 
SE will explicitly distinguish between the (possibly understood) bodily substrate, including 
hormones and the microbiome, of phenomena and the subjective mental component involving 
X.  Any question of a causal mapping from the mind to the body is ruled out by the massive 
influence of bodily activity, including homeostasis, on the mind. Top down mental control would 
also involve theological issues beyond the scope of (current) science. It is unscientific to 
postulate causal effects of a “mind” that has no substance.  
 
I also use the terms evolution and fitness in the conventional manner as they apply to all living 
things. We are adopting the broad notion of evolution that includes niche construction, cultural 
change and development that is called the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis.  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_evolutionary_synthesis. This includes consideration of 
group, niche, social, and epigenetic effects in evolution. 
 
There is no way for an organism or a scientist to calculate present fitness, since it depends on 
the future. We introduced the term actionability above to label an organism’s probabilistic 
internal estimate of the expected fitness of its potential actions in the current situation. Any 
living system will include such an internal mechanism for choosing actions. This will 
incorporate an estimate of valence – whether something is good or bad for the organism. 
Damasio (18) and LeDoux (24) suggest that primitive  valence in simple creatures like bacteria 
and amoeba is the evolutionary foundation of all emotion. 
 
It may seem too ambitious to study the evolution of subjective experience in the absence of a 
scientific explanation of the phenomenon of SE itself. Paul Cisek (36) makes a strong case for 
starting from an evolutionary standpoint in what he calls “phylogenetic refinement” and 
illustrates this approach with a detailed history of feedback architecture in the development of 
the brain. Joseph LeDoux (24) presents a related plausible evolution of subjective experience, 
emphasizing protection circuits as the foundation of emotion. His Chapter 27 includes a 
fascinating story on how neurons and nervous systems could have evolved, in multiple steps, 
from the sensing and acting chemical reactions in protozoa.   
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Any naturalist account of SE entails an evolutionary story and discussion of possible 
precursors, including protozoa. There is a crucial methological issue for SE that always arises 
– perspective. Most science is inherently public and is based on a general (3rd person) 
perspective, accessible to anyone who has adequate knowledge, and enforced by social 
practices.  
 
However, several related intellectual developments (34, 35) have argued effectively that the 
subjective (1st person) perspective is crucial for any science of SE and the mind. The “1st 
person” terminology is, by definition, inappropriate for non-human animals, robots, etc.  A 
generally useful alternative concept is “agent perspective”. We will also need to extend the 
standard definition of “percept” – “the mental result or product of perceiving, as distinguished 
from the act of perceiving; an impression or sensation of something perceived”. For us, a 
(generalized) percept is an embodied product of processing sensory inputs that increases 
evolutionary fitness. As we will see, such computed percepts occur early and often in 
evolution. In at least humans and some other vertebrates, percepts can cause SE. 
 
Independent of any particulars, the crucial fact about SE is the focus on experience from the 
perspective of an experiencing creature. This agent perspective is also popular as Enactivism, 
a component of the current 4E embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended cognition 
movement https://4ecognitiongroup.wordpress.com/  . However, the 4E movement (36) is too 
general for our study of the evolutionary precursors of SE.  In the next section, we will explore 
specific proposals including autopoesis, corollary discharge, actionability, and the umwelt 
approach, as a basis for studying agent perspective in simple animals. 
 
The philosopher and Octopus fan, Peter Godfrey-Smith (PGS), has written several papers on 
evolution and the mind-body problem. The most recent of these (23) shares many of the 
attitudes and ideas with this paper, but also has one major difference.  
 
Both efforts recognize the current mystery of SE and do not claim that studying its evolution 
will produce a major advance. They also both ground the project on the twin anchors of 
experienced subjectivity and the simplest animals.  PGS (23) has a succinct but strong 
discussion of the philosophical background for Levine’s “explanatory gap” between SE and any 
scientific substrate. His second section introduces the notion of “subjectivity” focuses on its 
importance for the conceptual analysis of SE. The key idea is that analysis must be from the 
perspective of a subject, which can be thought of as an animal. He then uses this formulation 
to consider several current philosophical arguments about the mind-body problem. 
 
Exploiting his position as a philosopher, PGS constrains the scope of his effort:  
“Levine also presented his gap through a demand for an explanation of why the feel of seeing red, for 
example, goes with this brain state. I don't offer explanations of this kind – those explanations are a 
task for neurobiology. “  
 
This where we part company - for me the relation between SE and causal brain/body states 
(embodiment) is the mind-body problem. Nevertheless, PGS’ third section, on Evolution, 
discusses many relevant facts and issues and will be cited below. PGS works hard to be 
neutral, but he starts and ends as a committed materialist/physicalist. He does allow that the 
notion of “physical” is likely to change significantly in the future so his hope is that the mind-
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body problem will be resolved by something that can be called physical. This is indeed a 
consummation devoutly to be wished, but there is no evidence of it.  
 
A radically different view of evolution and the mind appears in “The Case Against Reality” by 
Donald Hoffman (41). He proposes a “conscious realism” in which only the mental is real and 
where evolution has duped us into our beliefs about material reality. The book’s key technical 
contribution is the Fitness Beats Truth (FBT) Theorem. This states that evolution essentially 
always favors fitness over truth. As Hoffman says, the theorem is quite abstract and follows 
from the formal definition of Universal Darwinism: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_Darwinism. The result does not depend on any 
particular instantiation. The catch in the FBT theorem is that it provides no guidance on how to 
find the fitness features. The basic result is circular – Universal Evolution favors whatever traits 
improve fitness. This consistency result could be of heuristic and philosophical value, but does 
not help the scientist or the organism. 
 
One ancient and continuing mystery of subjective experience is why it feels so different from 
anything else that we know about the world, including our own body.  A related, and much 
more tractable, problem is the evolutionary fitness advantage of subjective experience. This is 
discussed in the next section, Origins, starting from related adaptations in primitive creatures.  
 
One of the clearest examples of evolutionary adaptation is what is called “perceptual 
constancy” or “subjective constancy”, particularly in vision.  Our perceptual systems compute 
values of several features that are not actually constant, but they do approximate the external 
(distal) world based on signal (proximal) values  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjective_constancy. 
 
 For example, we compute fairly accurate estimates of the size, distance, and motion of 
external physical objects and this is obviously crucial in acting appropriately. Quite a lot is 
known about the neural circuitry and computation underlying these constancy calculations in 
many animals (38).  What remains mysterious is our subjective experience of a fully detailed 
and physically accurate scenario. There is no known neural substrate for this subjective 
phenomenon and considerable evidence (11) that these SE are inconsistent with any known or 
proposed theory of neural computation. 
 
Another fundamental visual constancy involves color. Many animals can act upon the basic 
reflectance of objects in the world largely independent of changes in the ambient light, for 
example between broad daylight and dusk (39). Again, this has obvious fitness advantages for 
many animals, including in insects, as we will see. So perhaps the basic selectional 
advantages of calculated perceptual features (percepts) could shed light on precursors of 
subjective experience – this will be discussed in the next section. 
 
 
2. Origins of Subjective Experience 
 
Evolution encompasses all life on earth, but here we are especially interested in 
precursors to human subjective experience (SE).  It seems appropriate to start with 
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animals and their prototypical protozoan ancestors the Amoeba. There is a wide range 
of amoebic forms including our white blood cells. Free living “Amoeba Proteus” are the 
most commonly studied amoeba and are prototypical single cell creatures. They are 
described by Damasio (15). 
 
All living organisms from the humble amoeba to the human are born with devices 
designed to solve automatically, no proper reasoning required, the basic problems of 
life. Those problems are finding sources of energy; incorporating and transforming 
energy; maintaining a chemical balance of the interior compatible with the life process; 
maintaining the organism’s structure by repairing its wear and tear and fending off 
external agents of disease and physical injury.  (Damasio 15). 
 
Figure 2. Photomicrograph of an Amoeba  
 
 
The Amoeba, is described in:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amoeba_proteus 
 
“This small protozoan uses tentacular protuberances called pseudopodia to move and 
phagocytose smaller unicellular organisms,(which may be greater in size than an amoeba), 
which are enveloped inside the cell's cytoplasm in a food vacuole, where they are slowly broken 
down by enzymes. Amoeba proteus is very well known for its extending pseudopodia. It 
occupies freshwater environments and feeds on other protozoans, algae, rotifers, and even 
other smaller amoebae.” 
 
In his latest book (18), Damasio discusses even simpler creatures, bacteria, and their 
remarkable individual and group behaviors. The crucial point for Damasio and for this 
article is the continuity of the requirements of life and the evolution of fitness. Damasio 
frames this process as an extension of homeostasis: 
 
“Bacteria can sense the conditions of their environment and react in ways advantageous to the 
continuation of their lives.   … much later in evolution neurons and neural circuits have come to 
make good use of older inventions that relied on molecular reactions and on components of the 
cell’s body “(18, p.54). 
 
Joseph LeDoux, who focuses on the evolution of emotions and feelings, stresses the 
importance and ubiquity of valence for all living things. All creatures need to incorporate 
notions of helpful and harmful conditions and respond appropriately (24).  
 
 12 
“The survival circuit concept integrates ideas about emotion, motivation, reinforcement, and 
arousal in the effort to understand how organisms survive and thrive by detecting and 
responding to challenges and opportunities in daily life.” 
 
Perspective is another crucial issue for SE that arises even in these discussions of 
bacteria, amoeba, and other simple creatures. The choice of perspective can have a 
profound influence on how phenomena are considered. Most science is inherently 
public and is based on a general (3rd person) perspective, accessible to anyone who 
has adequate knowledge, and enforced by social practices. However, several related 
intellectual developments discussed below have argued effectively that the subjective 
(1st person) perspective is also crucial for any science of SE and the mind.  
 
The 1st person terminology does not make sense for non-human animals, robots, etc. A 
generally useful term here is “agent (internal) perspective”. Independent of any 
particulars, the crucial fact about SE is the focus on experience from the perspective of 
an experiencing creature. The Damasio and Wikipedia discussions of Amoeba were 
both from this agent perspective and the LeDoux survival circuits above are clearly 
agent oriented. Efforts to build robots or other autonomous systems are inherently agent 
focused.  
 
Two early and complementary scientific manifestos jointly provide an intellectual 
foundation for a science of agent experience from protozoa to human subjective 
experience. The dependence of a creature’s life on its surroundings is stressed in the 
“umwelt” literature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Umwelt). The German term “Umwelt” 
can be partially translated as “surroundings”. More technical is the Oxford dictionary – 
“the world as it is experienced by a particular organism”. The Umwelt will vary from 
agent to agent, as in this original von Uexküll example: 
 
 "Every object becomes something completely different on entering a different Umwelt. A flower 
stem that in our Umwelt is a support for the flower becomes a pipe full of liquid for the meadow 
spittlebug (Philaenus spumarius) who sucks out the liquid to build its foamy nest “ 
 
One important consequence is that animals can only partially perceive their 
environment. In addition, many aspects of the physical and social environment are non-
deterministic so fitness must address this reality. Probabilistic internal models play a 
major role in human SE (17) and will be discussed in Section 5, People. 
 
The key idea is that all living things must incorporate mechanisms that relate what they 
can try to sense to what they can try to do. This is foundational in all animals, including 
people and we will use general term Internal Model (17) for this function; this will be 
discussed in detail in Section 5. One crucial insight is that the internal model required 
for an animal’s fitness is not a veridical representation of the world (41). One general 
form of the mind-body problem is: How does an animal’s actions and its internal model 
affect its perceptions? 
 
Sensory input can be separated into two streams: afferent information, which is 
information that comes from the external world, and reafferent information, which is 
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sensory input that arises from our own actions. One proposed advantage for internal 
models is that they help us to determine whether a sensory input we receive is a 
consequence of our own actions. They also serve to filter out the components of input  
arising from our own actions. Even an amoeba reacts differently to external physical 
contact resulting from its own actions. 
 
In higher animals, this adaptive mechanism is called “corollary discharge” CD (45) , and 
is exemplified in the sonar of bats. A bat needs to know what sonar signals it has 
emitted in order to make sense of reflected inputs. Corollary discharge (aka efference 
copy) is also involved in the stable image over saccades that was our initial example. If 
you gently move your eyeball, the scene will shift and not remain stable. CD helps 
explain the neural basis for the “illusion” of a stable visual world, but the SE itself 
remains mysterious. 
 
The Umwelt story itself does not directly address the internal realization of behavior or 
mechanisms involved. The internal organization of all living things is exactly the focus of  
the Autopoesis literature - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autopoiesis. The term was 
coined by Maturana and Varela and is translated as “self-creating”.  
 
“Autopoiesis was originally presented as a system description that was said to define and 
explain the nature of living systems. A canonical example of an autopoietic system is the 
biological cell. The eukaryotic cell, for example, is made of various biochemical components 
such as nucleic acids and proteins, and is organized into bounded structures such as the cell 
nucleus, various organelles, a cell membrane and cytoskeleton. These structures, based on an 
external flow of molecules and energy, produce the components, which, in turn, continue to 
maintain the organized bounded structure that gives rise to these components. (Not unlike a 
wave propagating through a medium). 
 
Moreover, an autopoietic system is autonomous and operationally closed, in the sense that 
there are sufficient processes within it to maintain the whole.  Autopoietic systems are 
"structurally coupled" with their medium, embedded in a dynamic of changes that can be 
recalled as sensory-motor coupling This continuous dynamic is considered as a rudimentary 
form of knowledge or cognition and can be observed throughout life-forms.” 
 
The crucial point for us is that the autopoesis and the umwelt insights together provide a 
coherent agent-focused foundation for the internal and external constraints of life. The 
details obviously differ widely across animal experience, but the umwelt principles 
remain. 
 
We will focus on a broad, but bounded range of animals. The lower bound will be 
protozoa, prototypically amoeba. For the upper bound, we will assume that full 
“subjective experience” requires a “subject” or “self” (15, p10; 22) and that the only 
known subjects are human, prototypically a scientist with some interest in the Mind-
Body problem. Tomasello (31) has explored and described profound differences in the 
mind and behavior of humans and those of our nearest primate relatives. This will be 
discussed in Section 4, Primates.  Even protozoa need to be considered as agents and 
thus proto-subjects. That is, amoeba are living beings that react individually and socially 
to internal state and some external activity that they sense.  
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A major challenge in this effort is to disentangle parallel behaviors from actual 
evolutionary causality. The core idea is that all living creatures have many shared 
fitness requirements and will thus have analogous structures and behaviors. Similar 
features found in disparate animals could be due to convergent evolution 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convergent_evolution or a most recent common ancestor 
(MRCA) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Most_recent_common_ancestor, or both.  
Convergent evolution results from similar fitness requirements. A striking example is the 
extensive homologies in shape and function between aquatic mammals and fish. For 
another example, vision is believed to have evolved several separate times. My goal 
here is to explore what is known about precursors of human subjective experience SE 
and C1 (awareness), as discussed in the Prologue. 
 
Specialized abilities can serve essentially the same function as much more general 
capabilities in “more advanced” organisms.  It is essential not to assume that certain 
complex behavior requires particular embodiment, including subject-hood. A particular 
problem that I will discuss is a current fashion of using terms like SE and consciousness 
to describe the behavior of a wide range of animals, including insects and cephalopods. 
This is a standard concern and goes by the name of Morgan's (1894) canon: 
 
“In no case is an animal activity to be interpreted in terms of higher psychological 
processes if it can be fairly interpreted in terms of processes which stand lower in the 
scale of psychological evolution and development.” 
 
In Morgan’s time, much less was understood about brain and behavior and the canon 
was just about interpretation of behavior because virtually nothing was known about the 
details of neural structure and resulting behavior.  A current canon would caution 
against using human features to describe behaviors that can be explained more directly 
in terms of the animal itself. The core problem in the evolution of SE is distinguishing 
primitive functional capabilities from mammalian level SE. 
 
One striking property of SE is the inconsistency of subjective perception with the known 
physiology, computation, and behavior of the nervous system (11). Focusing on vision, 
we are familiar with many visual “illusions” and mysteries like those described in the 
Prologue. As discussed there, the perceptual “constancies” are among the most familiar 
and ecologically important instances of human subjective experience. We also 
introduced there our use of the term “percept” to mean the result of some internal 
processing of sense data, including internal sensing and corollary discharge. The 
(visual) percepts needed for effective action are not a straightforward function of the 
sensory input and much of visual science studies this.  
 
The requirement for additional computation between sensory input and actionable 
percepts is also very widespread among animals. Most basically, an animal must 
consider its own actions when evaluating sensory inputs. The internal signal of action is 
still sometimes called “efference copy” but is usually denoted more generally as 
“corollary discharge” or CD (45).  
 15 
 
“The CD taxonomy consists of higher- and lower-order categories that are based on the 
operational impact of the signal on the nervous system. Lower-order CD signaling is 
used for functions such as reflex inhibition and sensory filtration, whereas higher-order 
signaling participates in functions such as sensory analysis and stability, as well as 
sensorimotor planning and learning.  
 
Inhibition mediated by CD enables reflex coordination in diverse animals such as 
nematodes, tadpoles and gastropods. 
 
“ CD for sensory analysis and stability enables organisms such as the macaque, the rat, 
and the bat to move and yet experience the world as it is (stable and continuous) rather 
than as it is sensed at the receptor level (in a chaotic and piecemeal fashion).” 
 
CD is ubiquitous and a crucial part of SE, but it is not the hard part. The fitness 
advantage is obvious, but there is still no story about why (at least we humans) have the 
SE of the binding problem, etc. (11). Therefore, the core mystery remains Chi, the 
postulated mapping from bodily activity to SE. In the next section, we will consider what 
is known about C1 (awareness) and SE in vertebrates.  
 
We can further illustrate the situation using our running example of color constancy. It 
should be no surprise that other animals benefit from an ability to determine the 
reflectance of useful objects under varying illumination conditions. Many animals have 
effective color constancy. Moths are not usually thought of as especially intelligent (cf. 
bees) but their use of color and other cues has been studied extensively (39).  
 
The moth’s computed color is an example of an evolutionary early percept as discussed 
in the Prologue. Perceptual color is the basis for a moth finding the appropriate flowers. 
Hawkmoths possess color constancy: M. stellatarum and D. elpenor recognize the 
same flower color under changing illumination spectra. This ability is especially 
important for foragers that are active under a range of lighting conditions, such as 
sunlight and shade, and during dawn and dusk. 
 
Receptor adaptation contributes a large part to constancy. The sensitivity of the 
receptors decreases as a result of adaptation of the photoreceptor cells being 
stimulated by the background illumination. For chromatic adaptation, it is assumed that 
the different receptor types adapt separately depending on the background spectrum. 
Chromatic adaptation can be described by the von Kries coefficient law 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Von_Kries_coefficient_law), which scales the signals from 
the photoreceptors to the background illumination to keep the perceived color constant 
despite changing spectra. 
 
Hawkmoths have trichromatic color vision based on three spectral receptor types 
sensitive to ultraviolet, blue, and green light. Quantitatively, the sensitivity is between 10 
and 100 times higher for blue light than for lights of long wavelengths. This cannot be 
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understood from receptor properties including receptor noise alone, but indicates top-
down neural regulation processes that control color salience. 
 
Adaptation is another mechanism that supports constancy over intensity changes. In the 
dark-adapted state, a clear zone allows light from a given direction to pass through any 
of several hundred facets to reach the photoreceptors in a single sensor. This greatly 
improves visual sensitivity in dim light. In bright light, screening pigment migrates into 
this clear zone turning the superposition eyes into functional apposition eyes and 
adapting the visual system over several orders of magnitude of light intensity. The 
moths can also adapt to pursue colors (e.g. green) that are not innately favored or 
present in their natural habitat (39). 
 
This remarkable color ability of Moths is sometimes used in arguments that (some) 
insects have abilities that should be labeled as a form of consciousness (46, 47).  Some 
octopuses also exhibit remarkable abilities (22), but Morgan’s canon suggests caution in 
attributing these to mammal-like SE or consciousness. As we discussed above, 
Morgan’s canon and its updated version caution against this.  
 
More generally, in a standard phylogenetic tree (Figure 3) we can see a very early 
divergence of vertebrates (Chordata) from insects (Arthropoda) and octopuses (22) 
(Mollusca). The remarkable capabilities of bees, octopuses, etc. including learning and 
memory evolved concurrently well after the evolutionary split from the branch leading to 
vertebrates (Chordata) and us and so are unlikely to be directly informative on human 
SE. 
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Figure 3. Animal Clade Tree 
 
We will continue exploring the evolution of subjective experience in the following 
Section 3, Vertebrates. The main line goes through Chordata and seems to require 
some primitive brainstem mechanisms that are preserved even to humans (26). 
 
3. Vertebrates and Simulation 
 
We have seen in the previous Origins section that even the simplest animals exploit 
internal models and processing to convert sensory and other inputs to adaptive action. 
This is part of what is entailed by human subjective experience, SE, but not the whole 
story. The additional factor that makes the experience subjective goes by many other 
names including qualia, awareness, phenomenology, etc. and is a foundation of any 
notion of consciousness, as discussed in the Prologue. 
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Figure 4 Vertebrate Evolutionary Tree 
 
 
Although it is far from consensus, the dominant scientific opinion places the direct 
system precursors of human SE in vertebrate evolutionary history (Figure 4). In this 
section, we will provide evidence that a form of SE evolved in parallel in mammals and 
birds. Recent findings, including replay in dreaming, suggest that mental simulation (8) 
is a plausible basis for SE. There are certainly much older chemical and genetic factors 
in play, as discussed in the Origins section. That previous section outlined some 
impressive invertebrate abilities related to SE and introduced Morgan’s canon (62) that 
warns us against assuming that such behaviors should be taken as evidence for 
vertebrate mechanisms. We also saw that the remarkable capabilities of bees, 
octopuses, etc. evolved concurrently well after the evolutionary split from the branch 
leading to vertebrates and us (Figure 2) and so are unlikely to be directly informative on 
human SE. 
 
 A stable distinctive trait, like SE, generally evolves through many steps, only some of 
which are understood. The Last Common Ancestor (LCA) of birds and mammals is 
known to be amniotes (Figure 4), the first vertebrates to reproduce on land. Immediate 
precursors include the ragworm, which had the first tripartite brain, but lacked a spinal 
cord and the lamprey which is considered the first vertebrate. The rudimentary 
brainstem's motor programs remained confined in these creatures to executing 
protective reflexes as well as eye and body movements (12). Several additional 
evolutionary steps have been discovered. 
 
Hagfish possess a simple thalamus which integrates sensory information. The evolution 
of such a structure that could combine sensory information from multiple sources would 
have been extremely beneficial, providing a multimodal sensory experience of the 
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world. As other brain structures evolved, the brainstem became critical for generating 
states of systemic arousal, reward, and stress (12). 
 
Much of the core brain stem structure and chemistry of these amniotes has been 
preserved even in people, albeit with considerable evolutionary change. Therefore, one 
baseline for the possible evolution of human SE is the amniotes. An important feature of 
amniote brains is the centralization of perception and action in the brain, replacing many 
individual reflexes with a centralized valence system. Among other things, this brain  
centralization supports much richer internal models and functions, including simulation 
(26). Model based simulation is often suggested as a precursor to human SE and 
Consciousness and this will be a focus of this section. 
 
The upper bound for this section on vertebrates is the broad range of SE capabilities 
exhibited by both mammals and birds. These include convincing evidence for the 
standard SE examples in perception and emotion, but also dreams, etc. For example, 
no one seriously claims that dogs lack emotional and perceptual experience. The 
following section, Primates and Embodiment, considers evidence for additional abilities 
in primates and suggests some relevant experiments. This article does not address 
exclusively human capabilities, including language and reflective awareness, called C2 
in the Prologue, (6). However, SE in humans plays a central role in the People section 
and the Conclusion. 
 
You can see from the vertebrate clade chart (Figure 4) that the last common ancestor 
(LCA) of birds and mammals are the amniotes, characterized by breeding on land. 
Recent findings https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolution_of_mammals are starting to fill 
out various intermediate forms along the mammalian branch. Much of the vertebrate 
neural structure is conserved even to people and seems to be necessary for human SE. 
In general, similar traits can result from convergent evolution or from a common 
ancestor (LCA) or both. An excellent summary of the diverging evolutionary paths to 
birds and mammals is https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synapsid). 
 
For our purposes, it is best to start with Merker’s (26) magisterial review Consciousness 
without a cerebral cortex: A challenge for neuroscience and medicine. This BBS article 
presents an authoritative description of the general vertebrate brain-stem architecture 
and function. Merker’s direct focus is on consciousness, but everything also holds for 
SE.  
 
“This upper brain stem system retained a key role throughout the evolutionary process by which 
an expanding forebrain – culminating in the cerebral cortex of mammals – came to serve as a 
medium for the elaboration of conscious contents. This highly conserved upper brainstem 
system, which extends from the roof of the midbrain to the basal diencephalon, integrates the 
massively parallel and distributed information capacity of the cerebral hemispheres into the 
limited-capacity, sequential mode of operation required for coherent behavior. It maintains 
special connective relations with cortical territories implicated in attentional and conscious 
functions, but is not rendered nonfunctional in the absence of cortical input. This helps explain 
the purposive, goal-directed behavior exhibited by mammals after experimental decortication, as 
well as the evidence that children born without a cortex are conscious. Taken together these 
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circumstances suggest that brainstem mechanisms are integral to the constitution of the 
conscious state, and that an adequate account of neural mechanisms of conscious function 
cannot be confined to the thalamocortical complex alone.” 
 
The many accompanying BBS commentaries on this article agree with the basic 
assessment, and mainly stress that the thalamus and cortex also play a major role in 
human SE and consciousness. There is now general agreement that the amniote brain-
stem mechanisms are conserved in all vertebrates and play a key role in internal mental 
states, including SE. Therefore, this is a plausible lower bound on precursors to human 
SE.  
 
We start with some reports of SE-like phenomena in intermediate vertebrate forms like 
fish and some lizards. Fish constitute the earliest amniotes and, at least arguably, 
exhibit experiences related to human SE. An obvious focus is pain in fish, which 
remains controversial. There is general agreement that parts of the pain networks have 
not changed significantly in vertebrate evolution.  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pain_in_invertebrates 
 
“Although there are numerous definitions of pain, almost all involve two key components. First, 
nociception is required. This is the ability to detect noxious stimuli, which evokes a reflex 
response that moves the entire animal, or the affected part of its body, away from the source of 
the stimulus. The concept of nociception does not imply any adverse, subjective feeling; it is a 
reflex action. The second component is the experience of 'pain' itself, or suffering—i.e., the 
internal, emotional interpretation of the nociceptive experience. Pain is therefore a private, 
emotional experience.” 
 
So, here again we have the distinction between some underlying bodily function and the 
related internal subjective feeling. There is almost no suggestion of emotional pain in 
invertebrates, and the case for fish is highly contested. Since fish are the most primitive 
vertebrates and do have the basic vertebrate brain-stem structure, fish are a possibility 
as a precursor to some human emotions. Independent of any scientific issues, the 
question of pain in fish is a continuing social concern (48), but this will not be addressed 
here.  
 
In addition to emotions, visual perception has been the major focus of SE research. 
There is increasing attention to vision in non-human, especially vertebrate animals. 
Historically, much of what we know about visual circuitry has come from studies of 
mammals, especially cats and monkeys. An excellent recent overview journal issue is 
“What can simple brains teach us about how vision works” 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fncir.2015.00051 
 
The earliest vertebrates, fish, already show several important features including color 
constancy as we saw for moths, as well as additional features (49). 
 
“We have reviewed studies that reveal the mechanisms used by the visual system of fish for 
adaptive object perception. The fundamental functioning principles that allow the appreciation of 
objects as unified entities, segregated from the background and characterized by invariant 
properties seem to be shared between species belonging to distant vertebrate classes”  
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“Teleost fish represent an ideal model to identify basic information processing mechanisms that 
provide the functional building blocks of social behavior across different species with varying 
social systems.” 
 
In addition, fish respond like people to some common visual illusions (50) : 
“we show that fish perceive one of the most studied motion illusions, the Rotating Snakes. Fish 
responded similarly to real and illusory motion.” 
 
Again, this is informative about bodily visual function, but silent on SE. Moving on, many 
birds, particularly raptors, have outstanding visual abilities, but the studies related to SE 
have been mainly focused on chickens and pigeons. Of great interest here is (51). 
 
“ In the Evolution of Mechanisms of Object Recognition in Vertebrates: A Working Hypothesis, 
(we) will propose our current working hypothesis regarding the evolution of object recognition 
mechanisms in vertebrates, aiming toward explaining similarities and differences between 
pigeons and people (and other primates) found in behavioral studies.”  
 
Again, all of these findings concern the behavioral and functional aspects of visual 
processing, but do not directly address SE. Unsurprisingly, the range of SE 
manifestations in birds and mammals are much richer than in fish, lizards, etc. 
 
Wu (52) says:  
 “For vertebrates, extant birds and mammals share a number of highly similar characteristics, 
including but not limited to, enhanced hearing, vocal communication, endothermy, insulation, 
shivering, respiratory turbinates, high basal metabolism, grinding, sustained activity, four 
chambered heart, high blood pressure and intensive parental care. These bird-mammal shared 
characteristics (BMSC) are considered to have evolved convergently in the two groups. Given 
their similar adaptation to nocturnality, we propose that the shared traits in birds and mammals 
may have partly evolved as a result of the convergent evolution of their shared early ancestors.”  
 
One particularly interesting phenomenon is dreams. Mammals, birds, reptiles, 
amphibians, and some fish exhibit sleeping behavior. Some form of sleep appears in 
insects and even in simpler animals such as nematodes. In the behavioral sense, sleep 
is characterized by minimal movement, non-responsiveness to external stimuli, the 
adoption of a typical posture, and the occupation of a sheltered site, all of which is 
usually repeated on a 24-hour basis. Insects go through circadian rhythms of activity 
and passivity but do not seem to have a homeostatic sleep need. Insects and other 
invertebrates do not exhibit dreaming or REM sleep. 
 
Mammals, birds and reptiles evolved from common amniotic ancestors, the first 
vertebrates with life cycles independent of water. The fact that birds and mammals are 
the only known non-human animals to exhibit REM and NREM sleep suggests a 
common trait before divergence. Reptiles are therefore a logical group to investigate for 
the origins of sleep and dreaming. Daytime activity in reptiles alternates between 
basking and short bouts of active behavior, which have significant neurological and 
physiological similarities to sleep states in mammals. It has been proposed (53) that 
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REM sleep evolved from short bouts of motor activity in reptiles and Slow-Wave Sleep 
(SWS) evolved from their basking state, which shows similar slow wave EEG patterns.  
The general fact that mammals and birds share many properties, amniote LCA, and 
convergent features suggests that sleep is a good foundation for the study of the 
evolution of SE. Simulation during sleep is a crucial component of memory 
consolidation. More specifically, vertebrate dreaming in REM sleep seems similar to 
human dream behavior and could be a precursor to SE. The SE of dreams is produced 
from bodily activity that is (largely) generated internally and is thus plausibly related to 
my hypothesized Chi mapping from bodily activity to SE. Dreams are also an instance 
of simulation and are often described as such. In fact, one prominent theory of dream 
evolution is based on the simulation of potential threats (54). 
 
Simulation 
Simulation is another term with many meanings, one of which plays a fundamental role 
in this article and more generally in theories of the mind. The contemporary meaning of 
simulation developed along with the theory and practice of computing. For people (like 
me) with a computational background, this involves models of various systems and 
phenomena as digital computer programs. The “embodied simulation” theory of mind 
used in this paper (8) proposes that mental agents rely heavily on their own internal 
(neural) simulations for dealing with the physical and social world.  
 
From a technical computation perspective, simulation adds capabilities unavailable with 
static models. As we have discussed, all agents need “internal models” to map from 
goals and perceptions to actions. Many organisms also have capabilities for learning 
and memory that enable them to build and exploit new internal models. Simulation adds 
detachment, a powerful novel ability to evaluate variants of past experience and the 
possible consequences of future actions. This is central to my theory of the evolution of 
SE and will be revisited in the Conclusion section. 
There is a largely independent, but consistent, exploration of mental simulation in the 
cognitive sciences. In an oft-quoted 1943 passage, Craik ( 55 pp. 59-61): 
“If the organism carries a ‘small-scale model’ of external reality and of its own possible actions 
within its head, it is able to try out various alternatives, conclude which is the best of them, react 
to future situations before they arise, utilize the knowledge of past events in dealing with the 
present and the future, and in every way to react in a much fuller, safe, and more competent 
manner to the emergencies which face it.”  
For our purposes, it is crucial that the embodied simulation formulation of the brain 
supports detailed theory and experiment on the neural realization of simulations. From 
my computer science and robotics background, simulation was always the obvious 
approach. Simulation seemed clearly basic in people, but no one knew if other animals 
used it. Around 2006, I was able to start a research project on simulation in primates 
involving Jose Carmena at Berkeley and Mike Tomasello and Josip Call at the Max 
Planck Institute in Leipzig. The idea was to see if the animals could predict the outcome 
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of a Pachinko setup. Everything was more difficult than expected and the effort was 
abandoned. 
Meanwhile, there have been remarkable advances in understanding the functions of the 
vertebrate hippocampal complex in memory and simulation. Various versions of these 
phenomena are studied as simulation (8), replay (56) and time travel (57). Over the past 
decades, some profound discoveries have come from replay in mammals.  
 
Hippocampal replay is a phenomenon observed in rats, mice, cats, rabbits, songbirds 
and monkeys. During sleep or awake rest, replay refers to the re-occurrence of a sequence of 
cell activations that also occurred during activity.” Wikipedia 6/1/20.  
 
The main research focus has been the learned and exploited activity sequences in the 
hippocampus of rats. There are now several variants of both sleeping and awake 
simulation and replay in both the direction of motion and the reverse direction towards 
the starting point (9). These are characterized as high frequency oscillations, “ripples”, 
in recordings of cells in the Hippocampus. They have been shown to play a significant 
role in memory and planning (58). In addition, the rate of ripples was significantly 
increased at rewarding versus non-rewarding sites (59).  
 
This research was supported by similar findings in rats performing a goal-directed 
navigational task in an open arena (60). In this study, rats alternated between two 
behaviors in the same familiar environment: random foraging and goal-directed 
navigation to a recently learned location to obtain a predictable reward. The predictable 
goal changed location daily and goal-directed navigation to this newly learned position 
entailed unique combinations of start and end points. When the rat was away from the 
recently learned goal location, replay was strongly biased to encode spatial trajectories 
that started at the rat’s current location and ended at the goal. Indeed, during goal-
directed navigation, the rat’s future behavioral trajectories were strongly correlated with 
the paths encoded by neural replay events. 
 
Further evidence that replay may provide a foundation for mental exploration of possible 
future actions comes from a study testing the role of replay in avoidance behavior ( 52). 
After initial exploration of a linear track, rats were given a pair of mild shocks when they 
reached one end of the track. During subsequent exploration of the track, rats displayed 
consistent avoidance of the shock zone, stopping and turning around before entering it. 
Neural replay recordings during these pauses reliably encoded trajectories leading into 
the shock zone immediately prior to the rat turning around, consistent with a model of 
replay as a memory retrieval system capable of providing outcome predictions. 
Importantly, in this study the replay denoted paths to avoid rather than paths to follow, 
indicating that the content of replay is used to inform rather than dictate future behavior, 
possibly by coordinating the reactivation of amygdala-based representations of the 
valence of the encoded experience. 
 
In summary, the rat hippocampal complex recalls and exploits a neural trace of actions 
and their valence. These records are used for memory consolidation in sleep and for 
planning and simulation when awake. As discussed above, spatial locations of positive 
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and negative valence are recorded and used to modify behavior. This is a powerful 
illustration of the neural basis of emotions. The central issue of the Chi mapping from 
neural to mental activity remains mysterious, but the rich replay and simulation literature 
is one of the best topics to explore for the phenomenon of human SE.  
 
Some recent results suggest that songbirds have a parallel song replay mechanism 
(61). 
 
“Recently, songbirds were found to have surprisingly mammalian-like sleep architecture as well 
as sleep replay of song, a learned motor skill. In mammals, sleep replay in hippocampal place 
cells is thought to be a central mechanism for the function of sleep in learning and memory. The 
well-established co-occurrence of hippocampal replay with slow waves demonstrates the link 
between global sleep architecture and circuit-level mediators of sleep function. However, sleep 
has profound effects not only on hippocampal-dependent declarative memory, but also on 
procedural memory. These results establish for the first time similarities and differences in sleep 
replay comparing declarative and procedural memories. In sum these results show that highly 
complex sleep traits manifest across songbirds and parrots, and that complex sleep architecture 
is linked to song replay. This supports the hypothesis that shared attributes of avian and 
mammalian sleep are derived from a common precursor, and helps to illuminate underlying 
mechanisms by which complex sleep can affect procedural memory. “ 
 
The conclusion so far is that any close evolutionary precursors to human SE are most 
likely to be found in advanced vertebrates. Mammals are particularly relevant, but the 
fact that (some) birds exhibit related SE suggests that an important component of 
human SE appears in the general amniote brain architecture, especially in the brain 
stem and related structures. There is considerable converging evidence (26) that these 
sub-cortical structures continue to play an important role in human SE and 
consciousness.  
 
More generally, dreams, simulation and replay exhibit self-generated activity that could 
be a basis or precursor of subjective experience, as will be mentioned in the 
Conclusion section. Of course, people have a much wider range of mental experience 
including language, self-awareness, and Meta-cognition, which were labeled C2 in the 
Preface. Since the current article focuses on evolutionary precursors of human SE, all 
of this magic is beyond its scope. However, primates who lack language and probably 
C2 , are being productively studied to explore advanced aspects of SE. This is the 
topic of the next section, Primates. 
 
4. Primates and Embodiment 
 
We have seen that birds and mammals each exhibit a wide range of behaviors that are 
similar to those of human Subjective Experience (SE). Their shared precursors, the 
earliest vertebrates called amniotes, exhibit brain stem structures and activities that are 
also involved in human SE and consciousness (26). And, of course, human subjective 
experience is the ultimate target of this article. This section focuses on Primates who, 
as research subjects, have more human-like behavior than other vertebrates and also 
have brain anatomy and functionality more closely related to human SE. 
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There are two important benefits to studying SE in non-human primates. The first 
obvious advantage is that it is permissible to perform invasive experiments on primates, 
although fortunately much more constrained than in the past. We will examine multiple 
studies that localize individual neurons that embody subjective decisions or can be 
trained to adapt to body extensions like the cane of a blind person. The other advantage 
is that primates have richer internal models (17) and can be trained to carry out more 
complex acts of perception and action than other vertebrates. This functionality supports 
much richer subjective reports of experience, although still well short of human 
responses such as language. 
  
We will concentrate on two remarkable projects on the detailed neural basis for primate 
phenomena in vision and action. These are related to the powerful SE found in people. 
Some of the core examples of human SE in perception involve ambiguous images such 
as the famous face-vase image (Figure 5), which can be experienced as two different 
scenes. The mechanism underlying this phenomenon has been the subject of 
considerable effort, especially by Rudiger van der Heydt and his colleagues. In addition 
to a wide range of behavioral experiments (63), they have been able to discover 
individual neurons in monkeys that play a crucial role figure-ground separation and 
related ambiguous perception. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Classical Rubin (1912) Face-Vase image 
 
Figure 5 presents a paradigm example of the experimental power of primate studies. 
Behavioral experiments had shown that the resolution of an ambiguous image depends 
on the assignment of border elements to either the inside or the outside of the perceived 
figure. A border element is essentially always “owned” by the figure and not the ground. 
In the Figure above, the white triangles that are the nose of the face percepts become 
part of the background for the vase percept. 
 
Building on this long history of behavioral studies, the von der Heydt lab set out to find 
direct neural correlates of border ownership in macaque early visual cortex, areas V1 
 26 
and V2 (63). One key finding was that, for each border position, there is a 
complementary pair of neurons one for figure ownership of the edge and the other for 
the edge being part of the ground. The original study was for static images of 
overlapping squares and it has since been extended in several ways (64). Even the 
initial research has had a significant impact on the field because it was the first 
demonstration of a direct neural substrate of a famous SE shared by monkeys and 
people. This has led to continuing efforts to find neural correlates of other SE in 
perception and other experiences. 
 
One subsequent project has explored the important role of border ownership in the 
recognition of proto-objects. Another established that the same neural results hold for 
images of natural scenes (64). The van der Heydt team has more recently specified a 
detailed computational model (65) that involves top-down feedback from higher visual 
areas that aggregate mutually consistent border cells into groups. Such neural groups 
are persistent, interact with attention, and map over small changes in the image or eye 
position. This interaction of bottom up and top down processing is a cornerstone of 
modern internal brain models (17). 
 
Embodiment 
 
More generally, the continuing effort to specify  neural substrates highlights the unique 
possibilities of primate studies of SE.  Finding specific neural realization of phenomena 
like Figure 5 is a paradigm example of embodiment in the mind-body problem. People, 
experience SE with these and many other activities including listening, reading, 
empathy, imagining, etc. and these also presumably have analogous neural realization. 
Further consideration of the SE of human visual perception, its problems, and possible 
therapies will be presented in Section 5. People. 
 
So far, this article has continued the tradition of focusing on SE in the domains of 
emotion and perception, with some side discussion of dreams in non-human animals. In 
fact, subjective experience is important in many other aspects of mental life. We will 
now focus on a largely separate domain, motor control. One central question concerns 
the subjective embodiment of tools, prototypically the cane used by blind people (68). 
 
Tool embodiment is not normally considered in general discussions of SE. One possible 
reason is that much of the emphasis in this field is on prosthetics and other tools of 
clinical importance (69). Prosthetics will be discussed in the following section, People, 
and in the Conclusion. However, tool embodiment provides some of the most 
scientifically interesting and challenging examples of SE, especially in monkeys. 
 
The general phenomenon is that, after significant experience, the tip of a tool (like the 
blind man’s cane) is experienced as a body part and is directly controlled. This SE is 
quite common and you may well have experienced it yourself with a musical instrument 
or a hand tool like a screw-diver. There is even anecdotal evidence the operators of a 
heavy equipment like a giant crane come to experience the tip of the crane as a bodily 
extension. 
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For many years, tool embodiment was treated as a deep mystery of SE, with no 
plausible solution. The whole idea of an external tool being incorporated directly in the 
body’s sensing and control systems was counter-intuitive. The initial breakthrough and 
much of the subsequent progress was the work on monkeys by Atusushi Iriki and his 
collaborators (66). 
 
In the initial 1996 experiment, they trained macaque monkeys to retrieve distant food 
using a rake, and recorded neuronal activity in the caudal postcentral gyrus where the 
somatosensory and visual signals converge. There they found a large number of 
bimodal neurons, which appeared to code the body schema of the hand. After extensive 
tool use, the visual receptive fields of these cells were altered to include the entire 
length of the rake or to cover the expanded accessible space. This effect did not appear 
when the monkey held the rake, but did not use it.  
Additional studies revealed that after the tool-use training, monkeys began combining 
tools to reach even farther, a skill they were never taught. And the researchers 
discovered that these behavioral changes were accompanied by changes in gene 
expression in the parietal cortex and by increased intracortical connections between the 
temporo-parietal junction and parietal cortex (70). This adds important detail to 
understanding the mechanism underlying embodiment. 
In his 2019 Keynote Address at the International Convention of Psychological Science, 
Iriki discussed his research-based insights into the evolutionary phases of brain 
development and hypotheses about what may be coming next.  
https://www.psychologicalscience.org/observer/iriki-keynote 
In summary, after years of trial and error, Iriki and his team were able to expand the 
monkeys’ tool-use repertoire to include tools that augmented their sensory ability. The 
researchers took a hand rake, similar to those used in the earlier studies, and attached 
a big mirror at the end, adding a sensory cue to a tool that was already integrated with 
the monkeys’ body image. The monkeys were then able to explore the surrounding 
environment with the mirror and reach for the food with the rake. Several training steps 
later, the monkeys were able to use a small camera, similar to an endoscope, attached 
to the end of the rake. 
In more recent work (70) Iriki has pursued the examination of tool embodiment as a 
core aspect of evolution.  
 
“Hominin evolution has involved a continuous process of addition of new kinds of cognitive 
capacity, including those relating to manufacture and use of tools and to the establishment of 
linguistic faculties. The dramatic expansion of the brain that accompanied additions of new 
functional areas would have supported such continuous evolution. Extended brain functions 
would have driven rapid and drastic changes in the hominin ecological niche, which in turn 
demanded further brain resources to adapt to it. In this way, humans have constructed a novel 
niche in each of the ecological, cognitive and neural domains, whose interactions accelerated 
their individual evolution through a process called triadic niche construction “ 
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At this point, the embodiment of tool use has become “An open window into body 
representation and its plasticity”. The recent paper (67) of that name is a critical review 
of the way different tool-use paradigms have been, and should be, used to try to 
disentangle the critical features that are responsible for human tool incorporation into 
different body representations, an example of internal models. This study focuses on 
the role of tool use in human peri-personal space and the effects of neurological 
damage or Trans-cortical TMS intervention. It reviews a wide range of experimental 
paradigms and examines several open questions.  
There are two important scientific conclusions from this line of work. The more obvious 
one is the fact that growth of animal bodies requires neural adaptation so that the body 
image of peri-personal space matches the changing size of the body. Therefore, normal 
development requires some adaptation (70). The continuing insightful research on 
primate tool embodiment goes far to explain the neural substrate, but does not show 
whether the primates have the SE. The other insight, forward models (17) , is more 
complex and could play a key role in the understanding of human SE. I will discuss this 
in some detail in the next section, People. 
 
5. People 
 
Human subjective experience was the original source of the mind-body problem. This 
mystery was discussed in various ways by the Greeks (71)   
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ancient-soul/ and also in other contemporary cultures. 
The basis for the modern formulation is generally attributed to Descartes (72). One 
reason for the continuing importance of the mind-body problem is the presence of 
ubiquitous mysteries of everyday experience (11).  
 
And, of course, human language introduces a wide range of additional SE issues. We 
will not address these here, but our approach to language also relies heavily on 
embodiment and simulation (8, 81). Research on the evolution of language is making 
rapid progress, the recent excellent survey (80) is a good place to start. 
 
An intriguing recent paper from the Iriki group (70) suggests how embodied tool use 
could be a crucial step in the evolution of language. 
 “Humans have constructed a novel niche in each of the ecological, cognitive and neural 
domains, whose interactions accelerated their individual evolution through a process of triadic 
niche construction. Human higher cognitive activity can therefore be viewed holistically as one 
component in a terrestrial ecosystem. The brain mechanisms that subserve tool use may bridge 
the gap between gesture and language - the site of such integration seems to be the parietal 
and extending opercular cortices.” 
 
The first section of the current paper, Prologue, contains an extensive discussion of 
human Subjective Experience and its relation to the general mind-body problem. In the 
present section, the focus will be on some more technical results and how they add 
insight to our understanding of the mind-body problem. 
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Some profound results on the neural basis of SE have been developed in the context of 
human behavior.  The 1942 quote from Craik (55)  cited in the previous section is a 
famous precursor to current work on internal models and simulation.  For our purposes, 
some of the most important work concerns “Internal Models in Biological Control” 
summarized in (17). The general notion of “internal models” has been a cornerstone of 
the current article. All organisms and other agents must include internal mechanisms 
that relate inputs to actions and these have now been explored in considerable detail. 
 
As is well known, many human motor actions (e.g. playing a piano) can be too fast to 
depend on sensory feedback and thus must rely on internal models. Some of the most 
elegant and effective work on human internal models has been on the control of 
complex arm actions. These involve deep formalisms from engineering including 
Bayesian (probabilistic) formalisms and sensorimotor feedback control. In sensorimotor 
control, the specification of a particular behavioral task begins with a definition of what 
constitutes the relevant internal state x (which may include components corresponding 
to the state of the arm and external environment) and control signals u. Of course, it is 
the constancy values (e.g. size, shape) of the external world state that are needed for 
achieving effective action. 
In general, the state variables should include all the variables which, together with the 
equations of motion describing the system dynamics and the motor commands, are 
sufficient to predict future configurations (in the absence of noise). For reaching 
movements, the state x could correspond to the hand position, joint angles, and angular 
velocities, and the control signals u might correspond to desired joint torques.  
I will introduce these ideas following the excellent recent review by McNamee and 
Wolpert (17), using their example of tennis. Consider the problem of tracking a ball 
during a game of tennis. The response of any given photoreceptor in a player’s retina 
can provide only delayed, noisy signals regarding the position y of the ball at a given 
time.  An internal model is needed to simulate the probable trajectories of the ball. This 
internal forward dynamical model must take into account physical laws, such as air 
resistance and gravity. From a perceptual point of view, new sensory information at time 
t+1 can then be integrated with this predictive distribution in order to compute a new 
posterior distribution of positions at time t + 1.  
This iterative algorithm, known as Bayesian filtering, can be used to track states of the 
body or the environment in the presence of noisy and delayed signals for the purposes 
of state estimation. The results of such computations are advantageous to the tennis 
player. On a short timescale, they enable the player to predictively track the ball with 
pursuit eye movements, while on a longer timescale, the player can plan to move into 
position well in advance of the ball’s arrival in order to prepare the next shot.  
In the sensorimotor context, internal models are broadly defined as neural systems that 
mimic musculoskeletal or environmental dynamical processes. An important feature of 
putative internal models in sensorimotor control is their dynamical nature. This 
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dynamical nature is reflected in the brain computations associated with active internal 
models.  
Internal models that represent future states of a process (e.g., ball trajectories) given  
motor inputs (racquet swing) are known as forward models. Conversely, models that 
compute motor outputs (the best racquet swing) given the desired state of the system at 
a future time point (a point-winning shot) are known as inverse models. For human 
motor expertise, both kinds of models must be learned. Basic Bayesian feedback 
models have been used successfully in reinforcement learning for a wide range of 
robotic tasks (17).  
Whether contributing to state estimation, reafference cancellation, or planning, internal 
forward and inverse models relate world states across a range of temporal scales. In 
the tennis example above, internal models may be used to make anticipatory eye 
movements in order to overcome sensory delays in tracking the ball. By incorporating a 
motor response, forward internal models can be used to simulate the ballistic trajectory 
of a tennis ball after it has been hit.  
Forward models play a central in our consideration of the SE of embodiment. Recall the 
discussion of the Iriki research on tool embodiment (66) in Section 4, Primates. After 
considerable training with a tool like a rake, the tool was incorporated into the monkey’s 
internal model of itself, as shown by changes in neural receptive fields. However, we 
can also view the monkey’s internal model  from the perspective of optimal control 
theory (17). In developing the skill with a new tool, the monkey needs to learn a forward 
model of the tool use in the required tasks. According to my Chi hypothesis, Chi then 
maps the embodied forward model to SE, the same as for natural neural activity. There 
is no evidence that the monkey’s internal model is anything like the Bayesian theory. 
In people, there is a similar phenomenon of tool embodiment, prototypically the blind 
man’s cane, which comes to feel like an extended body part. Crucially, tool embodiment 
in people entails the Holy Grail of reported subjective experience, SE. Moreover, 
reported SE is now known to be a fundamental criterion for the success of prostheses   
(74). 
The  McNamee and Wolpert paper (17) also reviews the neural computational roles 
played by such internal models and the clinical and behavioral evidence for their 
implementation in the brain. In addition, there is thoughtful discussion of the technical 
problems that arise in more complex real-world problems of control and planning. We 
will further explore motor control and its embodiment as prostheses at the end of the 
Conclusions section. 
Blindsight 
 
One interesting class of human SE issues involves the inconsistency of visual 
description with visually guided action. One famous case has been called “blindsight“  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blindsight. People with certain deficits will not be able to 
 31 
report what they see but can carry out appropriate actions like grasping a tool. Until 
fairly recently, this has been viewed as a deep mystery. See, for example, this BBC 
program: https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20150925-blindsight-the-strangest-form-of-
consciousness 
 
In retrospect, the mystery of blindsight arose from the simplistic assumption that visual 
perception was a single integrated function. For our main concern of SE, a particularly 
important recent development is the widespread clinical and experimental work on the 
“two streams” model of vision: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-streams_hypothesis. 
This postulates that the ventral visual stream leads to the temporal lobe, which carries 
out object identification and recognition. The dorsal stream leads to the parietal lobe, 
which is involved with processing spatial location relative to the viewer and with motor 
responses. The basic model has been very productive in clinical and experimental 
research, but it is now clear that it is not the whole story. 
 
“We should view the model not as a formal hypothesis, but as a set of heuristics to guide 
experiment and theory. The differing informational requirements of visual recognition and action 
guidance still offer a compelling explanation for the broad relative specializations of dorsal and 
ventral streams. However, to progress the field, we may need to abandon the idea that these 
streams work largely independently of one other, and to address the dynamic details of how the 
many visual brain areas arrange themselves from task to task into novel functional networks” 
(71). 
 
In addition to the various cortical interactions, there are sub-cortical systems that can 
“hijack” the response to (visual) input. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amygdala_hijack  
 
“ The output of sense organs is first received by the thalamus. Part of the thalamus' stimuli goes directly 
to the amygdala or "emotional/irrational brain", while other parts are sent to the neocortex . If the 
amygdala perceives a match to the stimulus, , then the amygdala triggers the HPA (hypothalmic-pituitary-
adrenal) axis and hijacks the rational brain. This emotional brain activity processes information 
milliseconds earlier than the rational brain, so in case of a match, the amygdala acts before any possible 
direction from the neocortex can be received. When the amygdala perceives a threat, it can lead that 
person to react irrationally and destructively.” 
 
Taken together, these results reveal that the oculomotor system has access to motion 
information that is, at least in part, distinct from information used to support conscious 
motion perception. In an exclusively subcortical route, the interactions between the 
Superior Colliculus (SC), pulvinar, and the amygdala have been considered essential 
for the mediation of affective blindsight in both humans [45] and monkeys [46]. Some 
cases involve individuals being able to correctly discriminate emotional stimuli 
presented within their blind field; for example, distinguishing between happy and fearful 
faces that are presented in a forced-choice manner [47]. These findings support the 
notion of an unconscious visual pathway that can extract affective features from facial 
expressions without input from higher-order areas of the ventral visual stream, involved 
in face and object recognition, as well as to the absence of V1 input.  
 
Due to the presence of a broad range of preserved behavioral capacities in blindsight 
patients, there has been a shift away from identifying a unitary neural substrate of 
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vision. Instead, blindsight is thought to operate through multiple functional groups, with 
each group preserving an element of unconscious visual function, such as the 
sensitivity to motion direction. This is a paradigm example of a recent demystification in 
the mind-body problem, which will be revisited in the Conclusion.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In formal logic, a contradiction is the signal of defeat, but in the evolution of real 
knowledge it marks the first step in progress toward a victory. Alfred North Whitehead 
The ancient mind-body problem continues to be one of deepest mysteries of science 
and of the human spirit. Despite major advances in many relevant fields, there is still no 
plausible causal link between human subjective experience (SE) and its possible 
realization in the body. This paper suggests that considerable progress is being made 
on scientific constraints on any plausible theory of SE and points out promising avenues 
of research. Independent of the deep realization mystery, we can explore how SE 
became a stable trait and evolved to be the hallmark of the human mind. In addition, 
several SE phenomena are known to be incompatible with contemporary neuroscience 
so some new results and insights would be needed to bring them into current Science. 
Often in the history of Science, such anomalies have provided leverage for demystifying 
gaps in our understanding.  
 
As scientists, we must acknowledge that there is a world external to our minds and that 
we have no privileged access to it.  Formal systems are the best vehicles for expressing 
theories about the world, but 
1) Any adequate formal system cannot prove itself complete and consistent. 
2) A formal system or systems can be proven inconsistent. 
3)  “     “   “       “     can be shown to be empirically wrong. 
4) Science proceeds by testing and modifying formal descriptions. 
5) Modern computation greatly facilitates testing and modifying theories.  
 
The Enlightenment project was based on the false assumption that everything is 
understandable by the human brain/mind.  At any time, there are profound mysteries of 
the material, spiritual, and social world. Science pursues demystification, but should 
remain  agnostic about ultimate success. An insightful analysis of the Enlightenment 
project as a basis for society can be found in 
https://philosophynow.org/issues/79/Whats_Wrong_With_The_Enlightenment 
 
One core issue in the mind-body problem is the distinction between routine 3rd person 
science and the agent based (1st person) experience. The mind-body problem is a deep 
mystery because it involves both internal and external perspectives that have no known 
common ground. Many famous problems of every day perception are incompatible with 
current theories of neural computation(11) . Evolutionary success is based largely on 
current fitness of the phenotype, but an organism can only make an internal estimate, 
actionability, of the fitness of its actions (8). Even very simple organisms can be studied 
from an internal agent perspective and some old principles such autopoesis and 
umwelten have proven valuable in our search for the evolution of SE.  
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A wide range of converging evidence supports the notion that the vertebrate branch, 
which includes people, mammals, and birds, contains the most developed SE. More 
specifically, the vertebrate brain stem appears to be necessary for global mental states 
like sleep and SE. This structure is largely preserved and is essential in advanced 
vertebrates, including people. This can be viewed as a plausible lower bound for SE, as 
discussed in the Vertebrates section. 
 
Our working hypothesis is that at least a primitive SE is active in (many) birds and 
mammals. There are two main reasons for this suggestion. For one thing, no one 
seriously argues that e.g., dogs, do not experience emotions in ways that seem human 
like. Also, more technically, some mammals and birds are known to employ mental 
simulation, including dreams, in planning and learning. So, we should expect some 
evolutionary change, probably involving simulation, at the vertebrate level. In fact, recent 
studies (9, 60) have provided extensive description of simulation involving the 
hippocampus of rodents.  
 
However, there remains a large gap between the minds of other mammals and those of 
people. An intermediate stage can be found in primates. Primates can be trained to 
produce complex responses and behaviors and also permit more invasive experiments. 
Some human mysteries, like perceptual puzzles and tool embodiment have been 
elucidated by single cell experiments in primates (63-65).  
 
The SE of people is our main concern. Much of the basis of human SE can be found in 
mammals and primates. However, people alone can directly compare their experience 
with scientific theories and experiments. Several of the results discussed in this paper 
show promise of helping to understand the human mind. One important advance is the 
recognition that a human ability, such as vision, is not a single system but a complex of 
interacting cortical and subcortical networks. This has led to the understanding of 
phenomena like Blindsight (76), which had been considered a deep mystery. 
Science as Demystification 
  
A core mission of Science is attempting to explain the mysteries of nature. The history of 
science is largely a saga of increasingly sound theories of the physical and social world. 
There is broad agreement that the nature of the mind is one of the deepest current 
mysteries and one might hope that science will help demystify it. For now, the only 
plausible scientific stance is agnostic mysterianism (30) – acceptance of current 
mysteries and research on the boundaries between the known and the unknown, without 
assuming ultimate victory. Much of the historic success of Science has followed this 
paradigm and there currently are promising relevant efforts on demystification of the mind.  
 
A scientific problem or mystery is a phenomenon for which there is currently no plausible 
explanation. A related source of mystery is an inconsistency between two or more 
theories of the same phenomena. A previous article (11) made the case that the mind-
body-world problem is inconsistent with current neuroscience and computational theory. 
Such inconsistencies often lead to scientific revolutions. Much of the historical success of 
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science can be traced to concerted effort on mysteries. The evolutionary analysis in this 
article provides some useful constraints and suggestions for exploring subjective 
experience.  
 
This paper largely follows the current assumption that SE and Consciousness (Cs.) will 
eventually be explained scientifically and explores the constraints introduced by evolution. 
In fact, I believe that there is an unbridged conceptual gap between existing science and 
the deep problems of the mind (30). This article focuses on one particular mystery of the 
mind, subjective experience, but there are many others. I explicitly deferred consideration 
of reflection (C2, 6) as well as body image, self, free will, learning, memory, development, 
and social phenomena. Any science of the mind will need to incorporate all of this and 
more. My hope is that the present analysis will suggest conceptualizations and 
experiments that lead to some further demystification. 
 
Perhaps the most significant scientific demystification ever was the eventual disproof of 
claims for a life force or Vitalism. This is the belief that "living organisms are fundamentally 
different from non-living entities because they contain some non-physical element or are 
governed by different principles than are inanimate things" 
 
The Vitalism theory was challenged in 1852 by Friedrich Wohler, who showed that heating 
silver cyanate (an inorganic compound) with ammonium chloride (another inorganic 
compound) produced the organic compound urea, without the aid of a living organism or 
part of a living organism. This was not a definitive proof and the controversy lasted for 
several decades, but now Vitalism is a superseded scientific hypothesis, and the term is 
sometimes used as a pejorative epithet.    However, Ernst Mayr  (79) wrote:  
 
“It would be ahistorical to ridicule vitalists. When one reads the writings of one of the leading 
vitalists like Driesch, one is forced to agree with him that many of the basic problems of biology 
simply cannot be solved by a philosophy as that of Descartes, in which the organism is simply 
considered a machine... The logic of the critique of the vitalists was impeccable. In fact, the origin 
of life is still unsettled and analysis is parallel to the current discussion of dualism and reductionism 
in the mind-brain problem.” 
 
Several other ancient mysteries of the mind have been largely reduced to routine science 
within our lifetime. One interesting case is synesthesia (15), a perceptual experience in 
which stimuli presented through one modality spontaneously evoke sensations in an 
unrelated modality. This is discussed in (30). Another current demystification is underway 
in the evolution of human language (80). This advance is based on reframing the problem 
as the co-evolution of genome and culture in the eco-evo-devo research program  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolutionary_developmental_biology . 
 
 One striking recent demystification is the profound work of the von der Heydt group, 
reviewed section 4, Primates. For many years, visual illusions like the famous face-vase 
image of Figure 5 remained mysterious. In a continuing series of experiments and 
models, von der Heydt (63-65) has illuminated a neural and computational substrate of 
these phenomena. This is a significant advance in the naturalization of SE/qualia. 
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Another important current example of demystification involves the phenomenon of 
Blindsight (76) discussed in the People section. It long seemed mysterious that people 
with certain visual deficits could perform tasks like visual navigation and tool use while 
being unable to describe their visual experience. It is now understood that vision (as well 
as other traits) is embodied by a complex of interacting circuits. A remarkable 
consequence of this new knowledge is the development of diagnoses and therapies for 
some visual deficits; this will be discussed as a clinical application of SE research later in 
this section. 
 
How SE evolved as a stable trait.  
 
Evolution selects on whatever works. We have discussed many examples where fitness 
is improved by non-veridical representation of the internal and external world. For our 
Origins examples, this fitness constraint is nicely captured by the Umwelt idea, 
discussed in Section 2. For SE questions in vertebrates (e.g. perceptual constancies), 
we know that complex models and computations are involved.  
 
Evolutionary change involves modifications of the genotype that enhance fitness, but 
this can happen at many different levels. For example, color constancy of the 
Hawkmoth evolved through modification of the photoreceptor molecule to selectively 
respond to changes in the ambient spectrum. Color and other adaptive constancies 
evolved through a wide range of lower and higher mechanisms, which are not veridical 
and can be considered internal models. Such evolutionary fitness mechanisms can be 
seen as precursors of SE. 
 
A useful generalization is to call these adaptations “Internal Models”. There is a 
developing field studying internal models (17)  and we have exploited this idea in our 
treatment of subjective perception and tool embodiment. From the current perspective, 
the central issue is how internal models and simulation are experienced in ways that 
lead to adaptive behavior. 
When it comes to evaluating the possible outcomes of various alternatives, an animal 
needs to evaluate the possible resulting subjective feelings. As mentioned above, this 
was realized in 1943 by Craik(55).  The crucial fact is expressed explicitly in the 
following quotation from (78): 
 “A common way to evaluate outcomes is to anticipate how we would feel if they happened, and 
this has been called affective forecasting “ (emphasis on feel in original). This same ability to 
anticipate future emotions and organize current behavior accordingly underlies flexible and 
advanced preparation for future dangers “ 
Converging evidence indicates that birds and mammals have rudimentary SE and also 
effective mental simulation (often called replay), described in some detail in the 
Vertebrates section. This shows that, even in rodents, internal models and simulation 
are highly adaptive in behavior, learning, and memory.  
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The field called “affective forecasting” is a richly evolving discipline with a wide range of 
applications  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affective_forecasting,  but the central idea is 
that SE feelings arising from simulation of possible futures are essential for planning. All 
of this has now been made much more precise in the Bayesian Optimal Feedback 
theory, which was discussed in the People section. Simulation is now viewed as the 
core computational mechanism for remembering or imagining the past and modeling the 
future (82, 83), all of which require SE. More generally,  Kanai et al. (86) have 
developed a case for simulation as the foundation of Consciousness, which obviously 
also entails SE.  
In the current context, this says that the SE, which are known to be present in mammals 
(and birds), are the only known way that a creature can evaluate the subjective valence 
of a simulated plan. Therefore, given the SE in mammals, it was adaptive to link this 
trait to planning based on simulation involving internal models of the physical and social 
world.  There is good evidence that primates do sophisticated social planning (31) as 
well as the remarkable findings of Iriki on the embodiment of tools by primates, as 
discussed in the Primates section. Following my Chi hypothesis, when a monkey builds 
an internal forward model of a tool, this causes him to experience the tool as a body 
part.  
So, SE is an essential part of advanced planning and should be selected for in 
creatures like ourselves. A further insight comes from Van Boven and Caruso and their 
colleagues who have shown that people experience more intense emotions when they 
anticipate future experiences than when they retrospect about either actual or 
hypothetical  past experiences (84).  
Of course, the realization of all this in the body remains part of the hard problem. 
However, existing insights into bodily correlates of SE are already being used to 
develop clinical therapies and prostheses. 
Clinical Applications 
Emotional and other subjective experiences play an essential role in human life 
including in physical and mental health. For our focus on the science of subjective 
experience, there are some particularly relevant efforts on therapies and prostheses. 
Building on the technical descriptions in the previous section, People, I will discuss 
some promising links between scientific research on SE and applications in health care.  
Blindsight long seemed to be a mysterious ability of some blind people to successfully 
perform tasks like tool manipulation and spatial navigation. The confusion arose from a 
simplistic view of vision as a unified capability; this view persisted well into the 20th 
Century.  Some relevant developments are outlined in the People section above. The 
key finding was that perceptual awareness and linguistic description involved the ventral 
pathway, but many other visual functions did not. The spared visual abilities observed in 
blindsight vary across a broad range of behaviors, including visually guided actions, 
such as pointing towards or grasping an object and navigating obstacles; discriminating 
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among emotional signals expressed on faces as well as a number of cognitive 
processes such as attention and spatial memory  
More recently, people have begun to investigate these alternative visual pathways as 
pathways for aiding or training abilities of subjects with deficits. The state of this effort 
as of 2020 is beautifully summarized in the review “The Age-Dependent Neural 
Substrates of Blindsight” (76). As the title suggests, various blindsight problems are now 
known to rely on different neural substrates, depending in part on when the problem 
arose. This is an instance of the common phenomenon that trauma that occurs earlier in 
development is often treatable or even internally compensated. 
The well-known ventral visual recognition stream goes through a specialized structure 
of the thalamus called the lateral geniculate and then to primary cortex V1 and beyond.  
More recently, there is strong evidence that an alternative thalamic structure, the 
pulvinar, provides a parallel pathway beyond V1 to area MT, especially early in 
development.  It has been argued that some of these pathways, particularly those 
engaging the cerebral cortex, may have been rewired after damage to V1, mainly in 
cases where the damage occurred early in life (76).  
Advances in functional and connectivity imaging have revealed significant insights into 
the networks facilitating the preserved visual abilities seen in blindsight patients. Once it 
is better understood how the visual system responds to primary visual cortical injury, 
one could employ rehabilitative strategies to enhance (or even direct) this process with 
the ultimate aim of improving residual visual capacity.  
Prosthetics 
The role of human SE in prosthetics is much further advanced and is an active and 
growing field (74,77). Augmenting human capabilities with artificial devices has an 
ancient history. The first confirmed use of a prosthetic device is from 950–710 BC. In 
2000, research pathologists discovered a mummy from this period buried in the 
Egyptian necropolis near ancient Thebes that possessed an artificial big toe. This toe, 
consisting of wood and leather, exhibited evidence of use. When reproduced by bio-
mechanical engineers in 2011, researchers discovered that this ancient prosthetic 
device enabled its wearer to walk both barefoot and in Egyptian style  sandals 
(https://www.livescience.com/23642-prosthetic-toes-egypt.html). It seems likely that the 
wearer of this device came to experience it as part of his body. 
The most common embodied prosthetic device is the cane used by people with 
compromised vision. The use of a cane by individuals with visual impairment dates back 
to antiquity; a short stout cane was traditionally tapped to warn others to get out of the 
way and to set up echoes as clues to the environment (68) . Although this is not usually 
stressed, the user of the cane comes to experience the tip of the cane directly as a body 
part. From our perspective, this is essentially related to the profound discoveries of tool 
embodiment by the Iriki group discussed in the Primates section. It is also linked to the 
many instances of tool embodiment in people, as discussed in the People section. 
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In addition to use of external tools like the cane, there is enormous interest in 
prosthetics that are directly linked to the body. These can include visual and auditory 
and even dental implants, but the relevant research concerns on limb and body 
prosthesis. There is impressive and continuing development of artificial effectors, often 
overlapping with advances in robotics (74,77). Unfortunately, the state of sensory 
feedback systems lags far behind. While indirect visual feedback has some benefits, the 
Holy Grail is explicit embodiment, the direct incorporation of the prosthetic in the user’s 
body image. This goal is now conventional wisdom in the field (74): 
“We discuss potential clinical benefits of enhanced embodiment of the external objects by way 
of multisensory interventions. This review argues that the future evolution of human robotic 
technologies will require adopting an embodied approach, taking advantage of brain plasticity to 
allow bionic limbs to be mapped within the neural circuits of physically impaired individuals.” 
 
However, the difficulties of doing this are also understood (69): 
 
“Invoking embodiment has shown to be of importance for the control of prosthesis and 
acceptance by the prosthetic wearers. It is a challenge to provide (conscious) feedback to cover 
the lost sensibility of a hand, not be overwhelming and confusing for the user, and to integrate 
technology within the constraint of a wearable prosthesis.” 
 
The enormous benefits and challenges and of embodied prostheses are the subject of 
many efforts around the world. An excellent indication of the situation as of early 2020 is 
presented in (77). This pilot study compared various ways of achieving embodied 
prostheses against a range of tasks and subjective questionnaires. The paper includes 
detailed descriptions and illustrations of the anatomical arrangements and experimental 
findings. There are a number of supplementary figures, including several videos. They 
frame their experiment as follows:  
“We implemented a hybrid approach for restoring multimodal sensory information to transradial 
amputees, where finger position information (referred to as remapped proprioception) was 
provided using sensory substitution based on peripheral intra-neural stimulation, whereas tactile 
information was restored using a somatotopic approach, where the elicited sensation was 
correctly perceived on the fingers and palm. Furthermore, because sensory substitution can be 
implemented using a large number of approaches, we performed a side-by-side comparison of 
our results with the same sensory substitution approach implemented using noninvasive 
electrotactile feedback with one participant.	“	
They then performed a range of detailed quantitative tests. One of these involved 
estimating the size of one of four cylinders. The two prosthesis subjects had an 
accuracy of 78% as compared with a 98.5% for five healthy subjects. The researchers 
also explored several variants on this size task, some of which also involved estimating 
compliance. 
“Several control conditions were tested with participant 2. First, the same task was repeated 
with tactile feedback alone. In this scenario, performance was poor but remained above the 
25% chance.  However, further analysis showed that only the largest object was correctly 
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identified above chance level. This indicated that tactile feedback alone was not sufficient to 
perform this task (i.e., recognizing all objects) “ 
“We tested whether using noninvasive electrotactile feedback as a source of sensory 
substitution would result in significantly different results compared with the same approach 
based on intraneural feedback. Specifically, proprioceptive acuity was lower when sensory 
substitution was provided using noninvasive stimulation compared with intraneural stimulation. “ 
They then carried out a series of studies of particular interest to our exploration of 
Subjective Experience. 
“Last, we looked at prosthesis embodiment using a subjective questionnaire, which is a 
qualitative assessment and therefore intrinsically limited. However, because prosthesis 
embodiment is likely to play an important role in limb rejection rates, these types of 
questionnaires are increasingly used to evaluate sensory feedback approaches in prosthetics. 
In our case, it provides useful information when choosing between both strategies for the 
delivery of remapped proprioception.  
Statistically significant differences between invasive and noninvasive sensory substitution were 
observed for certain questions but not for others, indicating that prosthesis embodiment was 
lower when providing remapped proprioceptive feedback using noninvasive electrical 
stimulation and higher when providing the same feedback using intraneural electrical 
stimulation. In both cases, embodiment was higher than in the absence of any stimulation.  
Although both types of sensory substitution resulted in an improved sense of embodiment, 
superficial stimulation led to statistically lower answers on specific embodiment questions 
compared with invasive feedback. “ 
Unsurprisingly, although people can learn to embody feedback from remote body sites, 
it is more efficient and more natural to use feedback directly to the appropriate sensory 
nerves. Although (77) is a specific study, the paper lays out and tests many of the 
central questions about embodied prostheses. 
The End, for now. 
At the end, the ancient mind-body problem remains a mystery. There is no reason to 
postulate some non-material force that creates our subjective experience, SE. On the 
other hand, we know that existing neuroscience is inconsistent with this experience 
(11). But Science often advances as demystification and there are pertinent current 
examples, including tool embodiment and blindsight 
The core problem is still the gap between 3rd person objective science and subjective, 
agent-centered experience. Considerable converging evidence suggests that SE is 
present in many vertebrates and that simulation (including dreaming) is present in 
mammals and birds. Internal models and simulation enable these animals to exploit 
past and future scenarios, but this requires something like internal SE for valence. 
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We also know that primates, including people, have a remarkable SE ability to embody 
tools as interacting body parts and that this can be extended to protheses. The most 
promising way forward is using the increasing drive for embodied therapies and 
prostheses to recharge a science of the mind.  
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